The paper analyzes the effects of the increasingly expansionary monetary policies on the economic order in Europe and the European integration process. It is argued that a liberal market order and a tight monetary policy stance shaped in postwar Germany and in United Kingdom have long served as cornerstones for growth, prosperity and social cohesion in Europe. A prolonged loose monetary policy stance of the European Central Bank has undermined these orders, thereby diminishing productivity gains and growth. Combined with negative distribution effects, those monetary policies constitute the breeding ground for divergence forces in the European Union as heralded by the Brexit.
Introduction
A decade after the outbreak of the European financial crisis in 2008/2009 and the European debt crisis of 2011, the future of the European institutions remain uncertain. Institutional weaknesses of European Monetary Union (EMU) such as the EMU fiscal framework, a reliable bail-in mechanism and the dismantling of the doom loop, remain unsolved.
In contrast to the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been conducting an accommodative monetary policy stance since the financial crisis of 2007. The deposit facility remains at −0.4 percentage. The accumulative amount of bonds bought via unconventional measures such as the asset purchase program (APP) is kept at historic heights. Given deteriorating growth perspectives, the ECB has signaled to be "ready to adjust all of its instruments, as appropriate" (see ECB press release as of 25 July 2019) .
Government debt in many member countries remains at record heights. The German real estate market -the largest in the Union -shows signs of an overheating (Deutsche Bundesbank 2018) . The Brexit causes uncertainty, with a negative impact on trade and financial flows. Against this backdrop the support for extreme fringe parties is increasing.
Several explanations have been put forward to explain the rise of extreme parties. Piketty (2014) argues that since the mid-1980s the market mechanism has caused growing inequality, which is linked to increasing political dissatisfaction. According to Rodrik (2017) globalization is at the roots of growing political instability in industrialized countries, as competition from emerging markets has put downward pressure on the real wages of the middle class. Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2016) link the rise of extreme parties after financial crises to partisan conflict and policy uncertainty contributing to slow post-crisis recoveries. Doerr et al. (2018) argue that the banking failures in 1930/1931 exacerbated the downturn in Germany and thereby accelerated the political polarization. Algan et al. (2017) find similar results for whole Europe.
We propose an additional interpretation. We argue, that institutional weaknesses and monetary factors are another main channel for growing uncertainty and dim growth prospects, thereby fueling political instability (see Schnabl and Mueller 2017) . A growing centralization and a sustained expansionary monetary policy are undermining growth dynamics, thereby threatening the wealth-enhancing and peacemaking achievements of the European integration process. The argument is based on the notion that persistently low interest rates lead to structural distortions towards investment projects with a comparatively low marginal efficiency (Borio et al. 2016; Hoffmann and Gunther 2016) .
Gunther Schnabl is the corresponding author.
Economic Order and Growth in Europe from a Historical Perspective
The economic order of a country is rooted in its institutional and cultural traditions. As Europe has been traditionally politically fragmented and exposed to competition among institutions, it experienced an outstanding economic development. After World War II, different growth models prevailed in Europe, with the gradual opening of markets in some parts of Europe enhancing growth and prosperity throughout Europe.
Institutional Competition in Europe from a Historical Perspective
Historically, Europe has been politically fragmented, especially compared to large states in Asia such as China and India. 1 de Tocqueville (1835 Tocqueville ( /1945 , 166-168 saw many middle-sized nations in Europe as the cradle of political freedom, because a small population limits the power of the sovereigns. Institutional competition would lead to a decentral distribution of resources, which are therefore not available to an individual ruler in their entity. 2 Hence, resources could not be wasted by powerful sovereigns, but would be employed to benefit citizens. 3 According to (von Hayek 1944) large states are incapable to conform to different preferences of various regions and customs. Therefore, he regarded uniform rules as inefficient and recommended to strictly limit the leeway for supranational institutions that create common rules for a group of states. 4 Supra-national institutions should only adapt rules in realms where national parliaments have conflicts of interests due to negative externalities of national decisions. Hume (1742 Hume ( /1985 emphasized the importance of competition between political entities for learning processes if countries are linked by trade and migration. He referred to ancient Greece, where competition among independent city-states had created a fertile climate for arts and sciences resulting in a flowering of culture. 5 Weede (2008) deduces the emergence of property rights from institutional competition in Europe, because the existence of different governments enabled comparison, which lead to competition for a preferable institutional design of the state. Salmon (1987) sees "Yardstick Competition" to create positive incentives. If people -who disagree with the economic and political design -are able to leave, 6 the incentive for decision-makers to grant private property rights increases.
Property rights favor technical progress through competition as a discovery procedure (von Hayek 1968) . The prospect of retaining profits increases the incentive for innovation. The existing knowledge is used efficiently and new knowledge is generated. Given competition among firms, innovations are tested on the market and imitated if successful. The resulting productivity and wealth gains are particularly clear for Europe in a historical global comparison: Since the 18 th century, per capita incomes in Europe and European influenced offshoots have risen much faster than in the rest of the world (Figure 1 ). World War I constituted a caesura for institutional competition in Europe, as the war favored inward-focused economic development tilted towards the production of war-related goods and food, with the economies becoming directed by state-led cartels (Röpke 1950 (Röpke 1950) . The resulting weakening of economic activity favored further trade disintegration, leading to low growth, with the resulting slow-down of growth culminating in World War II.
Different Post-War Growth Models and European Integration
After World War II, two different growth and central bank models can be observed in Europe (De Grauwe 2012, 151-152) . In the Anglo-French countries, central banks pursued several objectives, in particular the stabilization of the business cycle and high employment. Price stability was only one of several objectives and the central banks' decisions were subject to the government's (i.e. the ministries of finance's) approval. Central bank-financed government expenditure was seen as a tool to stimulate growth. Since the 1970s, 7 this lead to high inflation rates in southern and western European countries, which resulted in devaluations of currencies against the German mark (Gros and Thygesen 1998).
On the other hand, the German central bank was designed as independent institution with price stability as a primary target. This led to low inflation which encouraged high savings rates, and ensured low risk premiums on interest rates. The independence of the Deutsche Bundesbank required that government expenditures had to be mainly financed by taxes and therefore had to be kept tight. Some smaller neighboring countries, which were economically strongly intertwined with Germany such as the Netherlands and Austria closely followed the German growth model via tight exchange rate pegs to the German mark.
The depreciation of currencies transfers foreign growth to the domestic economy, because the resulting changes in relative prices reduce imports and increase exports (beggar-thy-neighbor, Smith 1982) . From the point of view of a Prisoner's Dilemma, trading partners tend to retaliate by depreciating their currencies to counteract the negative growth effects on their economies. The consequences were competitive depreciations, which had destabilized the world economy economically and politically during the 1930s. Such competitive depreciations did not set in in postwar Europe, because Deutsche Bundesbank remained committed to a stable currency. This allowed parts of growth to be shifted to the southern and western European neighboring countries.
The German central bank did not depreciate the German mark, due to its focus on domestic inflation. This policy stance found support in the population due to Germany's past experience with hyperinflation. In addition, the liberalization of the domestic economy and the removal of barriers to trade during the ongoing European integration process had boosted growth. The larger European market enabled German enterprises to realize substantial economies of scale in industrial production. From this point of view, the different growth models in Europe can be seen as complementary. The productivity gains, which were over-proportionally generated in Germany and some smaller neighboring countries thanks to liberal orders, a stable monetary regime and the opening of the European markets, were partially distributed via the depreciations of the southern and western European currencies across whole Europe. With the common agricultural policy and European regional policy, additional redistribution channels within the European Union were put in place.
The upshot is that the growth rates of per capita incomes in Western Europe remained strongly intertwined despite different growth models (Figure 2 ). The mutual interest in European integration was reflected in the continuing deepening of the EU, which entailed both institutional and functional integration elements and reflected the implicit acknowledgement of the European citizens. 8 The institutional integration approach (a more etatistic conception of statehood, which can be associated with the French tradition) is aiming to create a centrally-directed Europe with harmonized living standards as an economic and political counterweight to the USA (Trichet 2011) and China. In contrast, the functional European integration approach was based on liberal and ordoliberal thinking of free markets combined with price stability (mainly supported by Germany, Eucken 1952; . It was joined by the United Kingdom with the reforms under Margret Thatcher. 9 Since then, Germany and the United Kingdom -together with some smaller northern European countries such as the Netherlands -sought to strengthen market principles within the European Union. The Single European Act (1986), which perfected the four freedoms -free movements of goods, services, labor and capital -can be seen as the accomplishment of the functional integration. The resulting growth of income levels favored the steady expansion of European institutions and paved the way for an institutional integration, which came along with the gradual transfer of competences to the supranational level such as in the case of the ECB.
Ordoliberalism and Thatcherism as Economic Pillars of European Integration
Since Germany has been the largest European economy, the German economic order has been central for the European integration process. 10 German ordoliberalism as developed by Eucken (1952) , Miksch (1937) , and Böhm (1950) and implemented by Erhard (1957) defined eight free market-oriented constitutive principles as framework for the private economic action, which should also shield off the government from the influence of interest groups and foster economic growth. 11 The main principle of the economic order designed by Eucken (1952) was decentralized decisions in relative free markets with free prices. Companies had to compete with each other in order not to be able to shape prices politically (constitutive principle 1). A stable money (constitutive principle 2) should ensure that high inflation does not distort price signals to prevent false signals for investment. Markets should be open (constitutive principle 3) to enhance competition between the largest possible number of (small) companies. This should ensure that prices were low and production was geared toward consumers' preferences.
Private property (constitutive principle 4) should create incentives to strive for profits, innovations and efficiency to benefit the whole society in form of rising real wages and growing tax revenues. Building on private property, all actors in economic affairs should -within legally prescribed limits 12 -be able to freely design contracts (constitutive principle 5). The privatization of profits implied conversely that losses are to be borne by entrepreneurs. This liability principle (constitutive principle 6) made the responsibility for one's own actions compelling to ensure efficiency-oriented decision making by enterprises. This should also prevent economic agents from taking excessive risks, with losses being not transferred to the public.
Economic policy should be constant and forward-looking (constitutive principle 7) to make intended and unintended consequences of economic policy interventions be better understood. Under a constant economic policy regime, investment can be better planed and implemented, which favors growth. According to Eucken (1952) , in complex systems such as market economies, many factors are closely intertwined. The constitutive framework was therefore regarded to only work if all the principles were fulfilled at the same time 13 (constitutive principle 8).
The success of the German economic order was reflected in high economic growth (the so-called Wirtschaftswunder), which resulted in buoyant imports from other European countries. Incomes in whole Europe increased (Figure 2 ). Considerable productivity gains allowed not only for a significant increase in wage levels in Western Europe, but also for the steady expansion of the welfare states. The growing scale of redistribution was already rooted in the German economic order with the four regulative principles of Eucken (1952) . 14 These encompassed redistribution and environmental protection should ensure that the principle of individual responsibility was consistent with the idea of social equality (see Müller-Armack 1950 /1982 Erhard 1957) .
The European integration process reflected both the constitutive and the regulative principles. The liberalization of factor markets (functional integration) transmitted the principles of competition, free prices and liability to European goods, services, capital and labor markets. The idea of social equality, as enshrined in the regulatory principles, became anchored via the creation of common European institutions in supranational policies such as European agricultural and regional policy. The European constitution adopted in 1993, which marks a milestone of the institutional integration, established the convergence of living conditions in Articles 174-178 of the European Treaty.
The market-oriented reforms under Prime Minister Margret Thatcher (1979 Thatcher ( -1990 ) constituted a fundamental shift of the British economic policy from government-led, central bank-financed demand management towards the rule of market forces (Card and Freeman 2004) . In a broader sense, despite its peculiarities, the Thatcher reforms correspond to the constitutive principles of German ordoliberalism. 15 Government expenditure was curtailed by transferring the competence for monetary policy decision from the Treasury to an independent monetary policy committee (Card and Freeman 2004, 11) . This shifted the focus of macroeconomic policy from the pursuit of full employment towards the control of inflation. Industrial policy was abandoned, public enterprises were privatized and subsidies were cut. The inflation rate fell from 27% in 1975 to 2.4% in 1986.
The balance in industrial relations was changed in favor of employers, with laws enacted to weaken trade unions. 16 To encourage private initiative and entrepreneurship the top tax rate was cut from 60% to 40%. To enhance competition and efficiency large behemoths such as British Telecom, British Airways, British Steel, British Gas and the British Airports Authority were privatized and restructured. The public was encouraged to buy shares to broaden private participation in capitalism. Council tenants were encouraged to buy the homes they lived in to make them operate outside the welfare state.
While, in 1973, Thatcher had supported the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Union, 17 she continued stressing that Europe was an entity going far beyond the European Union (Troitiño 2009, 132-133) . Europe should be a union of European states, without concentration of power in the supranational institutions. Therefore, Margret Thatcher limited the centralization process by restricting successfully payments to the European Community (No, no, no!/I want my money back!). 18 In 1990, she rejected propositions to extend the powers of the European Parliament and the European Commission (Thatcher 1990) .
Living conditions in Europe should be improved by using the European integration process as a tool to promote individual initiative and entrepreneurship, with the state remaining limited to a supervisor in the system (Thatcher 1990 ). To achieve this target, Thatcher promoted the Single European Act (1986), which became the first wide-ranging constitutional reform of the European Union (Troitiño 2009, 131) . Realized by 1992, the common market led to the free movements of goods, services, capital and labor among all EU member states. 19 The free market approach had from 1990 onwards a strong influence on the market-oriented reforms of the central and eastern European countries, which from 2004 joined the European Union.
The 'Big Bang' in October 1986 started a decisive deregulation of financial markets following the principles of free market competition and meritocracy. The reforms were based on technical innovation (from open-outcry to electronical trading), open access to trading (in particular for professional US agents) and the freeing of negotiations of commissions. As a result, international capital was attracted to the city of London, which constituted the basis for the rise of British income levels even beyond Germany and France ( Figure 2 ).
Whereas Germany and the United Kingdom became in many cases aligned concerning their defense of market forces in Europe, their economic strengths were complementary. Germany relied on industrial production and the United Kingdom on financial market services. 20 Industrial-based growth in Germany provided an incentive to irrevocably stabilize intra-European exchanges rate by joining the monetary union. The strength of the financial sector generated high growth the United Kingdom also without outright exchange rate stabilization. This facilitated the opt out from the European Monetary Union.
Prolonged Loose Monetary Policy and the Gradual Erosion of Market Principles
The change in the de facto monetary regime of Germany with the introduction of the euro constituted a milestone to growth dynamics and political stability in the European Union.
The Introduction of a Common Currency
A first initiative of a European economic and monetary union had been raised by the European Commission in 1969 (Werner Plan). Although the plan was never realized and the pros and cons of a top-down introduction of a common currency were heavily debated and criticized during the 1970s till 1990s, 21 the initiative of a European economic and monetary union was re-launched in June 1988 and implemented in three consecutive stages based on the Delors Report. The climax of the institutional European Integration so far can be seen in the top-down introduction of a common currency in January 1999.
From the start, the European Central Bank (ECB) was confronted with the challenge of making a common monetary policy for a heterogeneous group of countries. This led to two major deficiencies: First, the common monetary policy was unable to cope with heterogeneous economic developments, thereby fostering a unsustainable credit boom in the southern euro area. Second, political unwillingness and institutional rigidities in the aftermath of the crisis led to a prolonged loose monetary policy stance of the ECB. The ECB gradually moved away from a stability-oriented central bank model, as it was designed in European treaties, acting increasingly like former southern European central banks prior to the European Monetary Union (Schnabl 2017) . By opting out from membership in the European Monetary Union the United Kingdom maintained its ability to respond to asymmetric shocks, but the Bank of England's monetary policy became similarly expansionary by responding to financial market crisis with monetary expansion.
The Failure of the Common Monetary Policy in a Heterogeneous Currency Area
The business cycles of member states have to be synchronized to ensure the effectiveness of a monetary union (Mundell 1961) . A high probability of so-called asymmetric shocks -as it is the case for the European Monetary Union (Blanchard and Quah 1989 ) -require a high degree of wage flexibility and/or labor mobility. 22 As labor market regulations in most European countries have been traditionally limiting wage flexibility, fiscal policy has been central for the effectiveness of the common monetary policy from the outset.
A centralized fiscal policy (combined with a common social security system) can absorb asymmetric shocks. Tax revenues are declining in countries in recession, while they increase in booming countries. During an economic upswing, social security spending shrinks, while it increases during downswings. With tax collection and social security being centralized at the supranational level, idiosyncratic business cycles can theoretically be smoothed, as growing and falling tax revenues and social security payments cancel out against each other. The centralization of fiscal policies was, however, opposed both by the United Kingdom and Germany due to concerns that this would be the pre-step for growing central bank-financed redistribution within Europe (Starbatty 1997) . Instead the subsidiarity principle and the need for institutional competition were stressed.
If fiscal policies are not centralized -as it was the case for the European Monetary Union -idiosyncratic business cycles have to be counterbalanced with discretionary fiscal policy decisions at the national level to ensure the effectiveness of monetary policy. Countries in recession have to raise public expenditure, whereas countries in boom have to cut spending. Otherwise, the common interest rate is too high for countries in recession (with unemployment rising) and too low for booming countries (driving up inflation). The Maastricht fiscal criteria were designed to limit indebtedness to contain moral hazard in government spending 23 instead of balancing asymmetric shocks.
Moreover, from the start of the European Monetary Union national fiscal policies have been amplifying business cycles, causing a severe crisis. 24 Shortly after the introduction of the euro, the European Central Bank cut the main refinancing rate in response to the bursting of the dotcom bubble from 3.75% in May 2001 to 1% in June 2003. Based on various Taylor rule estimations Nechio (2011) and Beckworth (2017) argue, that the ECB was conducting a too loose monetary policy stance for the southern European economies preceding the financial crisis of 2008. The ECBs policy rate was set below the natural rate thereby fostering unsustainable growth and financial market exuberance, 25 while various members of the monetary union pursued different fiscal policy stances. 26 Germany pursued a restrictive fiscal policy stance, as -particularly because of the costly reunification -unemployment had risen sharply and public debt-to-GDP had reached the Maastricht limit of 60 percentage in 1999. 27 The government curtailed public spending and deregulated labor markets. The wage restraint in the public sector was transmitted to the private sector, which significantly reduced unit labor costs. The reform policies strengthened market forces and the competitiveness of the German economy (Burda and Seele 2016) .
The austerity in the public and private sector beclouded the business climate in Germany, causing investment and growth to decline after the turn of the millennium. Household savings increased as the government reduced pension entitlements and set incentives for private pension provision. Enterprise savings rose as unit labor costs fell and exports flourished. Tight fiscal policy together with wage austerity kept inflation low so that -given a common interest rate -real interest rates were comparatively high. This had a negative effect on investment.
With growing savings being not absorbed by investments and government expenditure 28 the fast-rising German savings surplus was exported via bank-lending to countries inside and outside the European Monetary Union (including the United Kingdom). The resulting capital inflows and loose monetary conditions fueled boom phases in the recipient countries which translated into wage hikes, increasing consumption and increasing prices. Falling real interest rates encouraged investment as well as speculation in real estate and equity markets. The financial markets in London boomed. The resulting increase in tax revenues seduced to dramatic increases in government spending (Figure 3) , which further reinforced the boom. The growing current account imbalances (Figure 4 ) symbolize the real divergence in the common currency area (and beyond). 29 
Monetary Expansion and the Erosion of Market Forces
While the southern and western periphery of the euro area slipped into crisis due to high external debt, German, British other northern European banks, which had provided credit during the boom, were threatened by defaults. The European Central Bank and the Bank of England reacted -similarly to the US Federal Reserve in the wake of the US subprime crisis -with an unprecedented monetary expansion ( Figure 5 ). Key interest rates were cut (close) to zero. The balance sheets were strongly expanded by purchases of (predominantly) government bonds. The ultra-low monetary policies of the European Central Bank and the Bank of England prevented the collapse of financial institutions and governments. Growth, hesitantly, recovered. 31 An asymmetric and prolonged loose monetary policy stance increasingly undermines the constitutive principles of a market-oriented order (see Freytag and Schnabl 2017) . First, the free-market interest rate mechanism has become disrupted. With interest rates being pushed towards zero both at the short (via conventional monetary policy) and the long end of the yield curve (via forward guidance and unconventional monetary policy), the signaling function of interest rates is suspended. Low interest rates encourage high levels of indebtedness and distort default risks of banks, companies and governments. Likewise, rising equity and real estate prices do no longer reflect increasing efficiency but benign liquidity conditions. 32 Second, monetary stability as a prerequisite for an efficient allocation of resources is undermined. Although prices of goods and services remain stable, the expansionary monetary policy has driven up prices in financial and real estate markets in erratic cycles. 33 Artificially inflated asset prices distort investment decisions. Financial market speculation is encouraged at the cost of investment in innovation and efficiency gains. The boom and bust cycles in financial markets are linked to growing economic instability, which further discourages fixed capital investment .
Third, the bailout of financial institutions distorts competition. In crisis, large financial institutions are more likely to be rescued through recapitalizations because they are considered to be too big to fail. If monetary expansion persists (as since 2008), the margins between credit and deposit interest rates are squeezed (Borio et al. 2016; Gerstenberger and Schnabl 2017) . Large financial institutions can better compensate for the loss of this traditional source of revenue by investment banking, where economies of scale matter. In contrast, small and medium financial institutions face a competitive disadvantage and are forced to merge or are taken over by larger competitors.
Fourth, private ownership in financial markets is restricted, if in crises collapsing financial institutions are nationalized (for example Commerzbank in Germany, Northern Rock in the United Kingdom). Ultra-loose monetary policy is equivalent to a partly hidden nationalization, if interest rates are persistently held low to prevent instability of the financial sector. Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) have created the notion of zombification: banks keep non-profitable enterprises alive to prevent bad loans from becoming visible in their balance sheets.
Fifth, freedom of contract in financial markets is undermined, because financial exuberance is followed by growing regulation (micro-and macroprudential measures) to prevent new crises in the future. Since the onset of the European debt crisis, both at the national and European level, extensive documentation requirements and higher equity provisions are restraining the business activity of banks (Barth et al. 2013) . As large banks have more resources at hand to cope with the incurred costs, regulation distorts competition at the benefit of large entities.
Sixth, the liability principle is undermined. In the low-interest driven boom phases, profits from excessive credit growth and speculation in financial markets are privatized. When fragile financial institutions are recapitalized or stabilized by monetary expansion, the potential losses are shifted to the public. The anticipation of monetary rescue operations increasingly undermines the liability principle through moral hazard.
Seventh, as the growing monetary expansions has inflated financial markets, the likelihood and size of crises has increased, necessitating a growing scale of rescue measures. The unintended side effects of large policy interventions entail new economic policy interventions (intervention spirals, Mises 1949, 712-729) , with the principle of constant economic policy making being undermined.
Thus, from a financial market perspective none of Eucken's (1952) constitutive principles are fully fulfilled any more, neither in the euro area, nor in the United Kingdom, nor in the rest of the EU.
Growth and Distribution Effects as Catalysts for Political Divergence
As the prolonged loose monetary policy conditions can be associated with low growth and distributional effects, they form the breeding ground for political polarization that jeopardizers -as in the case of the Brexitthe achievements of the European integration process.
Negative Growth Effects of Monetary Policy Rescue Operations
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Growth arises from specialization (Smithian growth), capital accumulation (Solowian growth) and capital reallocation (Schumpeterian growth). Given a constant capital stock, Smith (1982) sees growth as the product of a continuing process of division of labor (specialization) in the workplace, i.e. an more efficient allocation of resources. According to Smith (1982) , 17-20 the great increase in specialization/division of labor is due to (1) an increase of dexterity of every laborer, (2) time saving as the process of switching between tasks is increasingly avoided, and (3) invention of machines that enable a higher output per worker. As the economy becomes increasingly specialized the likelihood of innovation increases. 35 In the neoclassical theory, growth arises through the accumulation of capital until the economy converges to a long-run equilibrium of gross investment and depreciation (Solow 1956 ). This equilibrium (steady state) is based on the assumption that the marginal productivity of investment diminishes with the size of the capital stock. Growth beyond this point is only possible if there is innovation (technological progress) (Solow 1957) .
According to Schumpeter (1987) , 99-100, economic development results from the implementation and enforcement of new combinations of production factors. Entrepreneurs reform the structure of production, either through a new product, a new source of raw material, a new territory, or by reorganizing an industry (Schumpeter 1993, 214). Other producers imitate the newly established production structures and products. Markets adapt to a new equilibrium. This process, which revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroys the old structure and creates new ones. 36 A prolonged loose monetary policy stance undermines the second and third pillar of the aforementioned sources of economic growth. With the monetary expansion and the erosion of Eucken's market principles, incentives for innovation and for increasing efficiency have become gradually eroded. During boom phases, low or falling interest rates have triggered investment projects with low marginal efficiency due to relaxed financing constraints. During crisis, sharp interest rate cuts have hindered the re-allocative process and have kept investment projects with lower marginal efficiency alive. Persistently low interest rates are tying factors of production in projects with a low marginal efficiency. Consequently, the average marginal efficiency of investment remains low or even falls further. 37 Leibenstein (1966) sees motivation and incentives as important determinants of a dynamic efficiency concept that goes beyond static allocation efficiency. Companies do not realize all potential efficiency gains when competition is limited. If ultra-loose monetary policies disturb competition, for instance by creating speculative profit opportunities through decreasing financing costs and by making bail outs predictable, innovations and the associated efficiency gains shrink. Competition as a discovery procedure (von Hayek 1968) is disturbed.
The empirical literature, which associates low interest rates with declining productivity gains, is growing. Borio et al. (2016) show that during credit-driven booms, labor is shifted to low-productivity investment projects, resulting in a lower average productivity. 38 Peek and Rosengren (2005) see a misallocation of capital via the credit sector in Japan, which keeps companies with poor earnings prospects alive ("ever-greening"). Gerstenberger and Schnabl (2017) shows for Germany that the improved financing conditions since 2008 have been accompanied by falling productivity gains of small and medium enterprises. Gopinath et al. (2017) argue, that the significant decline in productivity gains in southern Europe since the crisis has been linked to the misallocation of capital. Barnett et al. (2014) show for the United Kingdom that productivity gains have fallen sharply since 2007. 39 Kornai (1986) coined the concept of soft budget constraints for the socialist planning economies. As the central governments feared unemployment, state-controlled banks provided cheap credits to unproductive firms. The losses of the banks were covered by the central banks via the printing press. The result was an inefficient capital stock, weak innovation activity as well as low -or even negative -growth rates. Discontent in the population grew because consumer goods were scarce and of poor quality. Figure 6 shows investment as percent of GDP, productivity growth and real growth in Germany and the United Kingdom since 1990. In Germany, which has been the growth engine of Europe up to the present, investment as a percent of GDP has gradually declined accompanied by shrinking productivity gains and real growth. While growth in the United Kingdom has recently recovered due to the depreciation of the pound against the euro, investment as percent of GDP and productivity gains remain sluggish. 
Distributional Effects
The prolonged expansionary monetary policies of the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have distributional effects at the national levels . 40 First, with interest rates being cut towards zero and large amounts of bonds being purchased by central banks, debtors benefit at the expense of creditors. In particular, highly indebted governments gain. As most of the assets bought by central banks are government bonds, the hard budget constraint on public expenditure is eased with high debt levels becoming sustainable due to low interest rates. The burden is shifted to borrowers in the private sector via lower interest rate payments on the outstanding government bonds and on private bank deposits.
Second, expansionary monetary policies favor the direct downstream recipients at the expense of others as the money arrives there before prices adjust (Cantillon 1931) . This typically applies to the financial sector which extends the credit volume, and/or buys shares, real estate and securities at prevailing market prices. Once the newly created money trickles through the economy, asset prices are rising, thereby inflating the value of financial institutions' assets. If asset market bubbles burst, central banks contain the losses of financial institutions with further monetary expansion. 41 This results in a redistribution in favor of the first mover (financial sector) at the costs for those who are further downstream from central bank liquidity, i.e. households and enterprises (Cantillon effect) .
Third, with asset prices being driven upwards, ultra-loose monetary policies make the wealthy people richer, because equity and real estate is primarily concentrated in higher-income classes. By contrast, interest rates on bank deposits, which make up a large proportion of middle-and low-income groups' savings, have been pushed to zero. In addition, as productivity gains, which are the prerequisite for real wages increases, are repressed (4.1.), increases of real wages slow down and even turn negative. 42 Fourth, a permanent loose monetary policy can be associated with distributional effects between young and old, as pressure on wages (originating in depressed productivity gains) does not affect all age cohorts equally. For instance, in Japan, where monetary condition have been lax for over 30 years, wage levels tend to remain high and jobs tend to remain safe for the elderly, while a growing share of less qualified new labor market entrants face lower wages. The share of employment forms with part-time and temporary contracts is rising (Israel and Latsos 2019) . If young people want to acquire assets, in particular the prices of real estate and stocks in terms of yearly incomes has dramatically increased. If both partners work, family planning tends to be postponed and the number of children declines. 43 The restraint in wages has hit different European countries at different points of time. In Germany, real wages have tended to stagnate already from the late 1990s (Figure 7) linked to negative growth effects of extensive reforms. 44 The resulting productivity gains were mainly exported via capital outflows (and current account surpluses) to other European countries (instead of being used for real wage increases), in particular to southern, eastern and western European countries (Figure 7 ). In the capital inflow recipient countries, real wages could grow beyond productivity gains. Since the crisis, wage levels in the crisis countries such as Italy and Spain, but also United Kingdom got under downward pressure, as private capital inflows have declined. In Germany, nominal and real wages are slightly increasing since then, as the fast expansion in the real estate market and the export sector have substantially boosted the demand in labor markets. The United Kingdom profited from buoyant capital inflows into the financial sector since the mid 1990s, which allowed substantial nominal and real wage increases up to outbreak of global financial crisis in 2008. Since then, less net capital inflows, growing financial regulation and uncertainty linked to the Brexit have come along with a restraint on wage increases.
Fifth, large economic entities benefit at the cost of small entities. This applies to banks and enterprises. Because unconventional monetary policies depress the margin between lending and deposit rates, they erode the main source of income of the traditional banking business (i.e. credit provision). In contrast, the benign liquidity conditions inflate asset market transactions (including mergers and acquisitions) (Bordo and LandonLane 2013) , making in particular investment banking more profitable. As in asset markets economies of scale matter, large (investment) banks benefit at the cost of small and medium (lending-oriented) banks. 45 Therefore, gradual interest rate cuts toward zero have for long promoted the development of financial centers such as London or Frankfurt, where big banks are clustered.
In the enterprises sector concentration is growing (De Loecker and Jan 2017; Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017), which can be associated to the loose monetary conditions as well. Large enterprises benefit relative to small enterprises because they have access to low-interest rate capital market financing. In the course of unconventional monetary policies, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have bought bonds of large enterprises. Both factors have driven up values of stock-listed enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises, by contrast, remain dependent on bank loans. As this puts small and medium sized banks at a competitive disadvantage, credit provision to SMEs is even more constraint. With the help of cheap financing conditions, large enterprises can increase their market power, for instance by taking over smaller competitors. With the increasing concentration in the corporate and financial sectors, salaries of top managers are rising.
Sixth, as loose monetary policies affect disproportionately large financial institutions and companies and their suppliers they alter the regional economic structure, if large entities tend to be concentrated in certain regions. Economic centers, where large companies are clustered, gain. The regions, where only small and medium enterprises are located, exhibit a relative disadvantage and are shrinking. In the search for well-paid jobs, young people have an incentive to move from the periphery to the economic centers, thereby amplifying the divergence forces between urban and rural areas.
Within Europe, London has profited from Margret Thatcher's Big Bang, with London not only reaping the benefits from financial liberalization. The city has also benefitted like Luxemburg or Switzerland from the redistribution effect of the increasingly loose monetary policies in favor of the financial sector and in favor of rich people. In Germany regions have gained, where large, export-oriented enterprises and their subcontractors are located (for instance in southern Germany). As the loose monetary policies have also favored government expenditure and regulation, centers of public administration such as Brussels, Paris, Rom, and Berlin have gained.
Shrinking Approval Rates and Political Polarization
According to Rawls (1972 Rawls ( /1999 , an order is considered to be just if all people have equal freedoms and opportunities, and social and economic inequalities bring the greatest benefit to the least favored. 46 Liberal economic orders aim to ensure equal freedoms and opportunities. As economic freedom delivers high economic growth and productivity gains, real wages increase for all parts of the population, including the least favored. The social security system can be expanded, ensuring the acceptance of the economic order and the support for the ruling parties, as observed in Europe after World War II.
The market-oriented economic order in Germany was crucial for the European integration process, because it led to high growth in Europe. This ensured the political acceptance of the expansion of the four freedoms, as voters associated the liberalization of European markets with prosperity gains. The completion of the common market was supported by the market-oriented reforms including financial market liberalization in the United Kingdom. Germany and the United Kingdom became the largest net payers to the European Union and thereby the economic pillars of the further proceeding institutional integration.
This redistribution was accepted in the United Kingdom as long as the development in the financial sector ensured substantial real wage increases for most parts of the population (Figure 7) . In Germany, the political elites accept the redistribution in favor of other European countries because the large export-oriented industrial sector continues to gain via large current account surpluses. They also continue to associate membership in the European Union with providing financing.
The redistribution between the member states of the European Union remained limited as long as it was carried over national budgets and thereby required the consent of each individual country in the European Council. 47 Net payments provided via the national budget requires the consensus of the parliaments. This has changed, however, for Germany with the prolonged monetary policy rescue measures of the European Central Bank. Since the outbreak of the crisis, zero interest rates and large government bond purchases of the ECB have relaxed the budget constraint of indebted southern European crisis countries.
Since 2008, the southern euro area national central banks have accumulated TARGET2 liabilities equivalent to around 1500 billion euros, with close to 1000 billion TARGET2 claims being provided by the Bundesbank. 48 Given that the United Kingdom does not participate in the European Monetary Union the balances of the Bank of England in the TARGET2 payments system have to be kept equilibrated, with the Bank of England not accumulating claims or liabilities.
Among other factors, prolonged monetary policy rescue measures in the European Monetary Union contribute to rising political polarization in the northern part of Europe, as they undermine the market-oriented orders and redistribute wealth. With persistently low interest rates, incentives for enterprises to increase productivity have become eroded, as the liability principle is softened. The global financial crisis and the resulting regulations have undermined the ability of the financial sector to allocate capital efficiently.
As productivity gains are declining, intra-EU redistribution policies are increasingly difficult to finance and are eventually becoming a zero-sum game. In contrast to the 1950s to 1990s, when positive productivity gains were shared across whole Europe, transfers in favor of the common institutions and of other European countries are gradually at the cost of growing parts of the population of the northern European countries, in form of tax increases and/or austerity in wages and government expenditure. In Germany, low real wage increases combined with a deteriorating infrastructure (among other factors) cause increasing dissatisfaction among voters. Growing income and wealth inequality has become a major determinant of political unrest in many EU member states.
The upshot is, that in parliamentary elections the support for traditional parties, which have been supporting the European integration process for decades, is fading. Using the data from the IWP Index for political polarization Figure 8 depicts the voting shares of extreme left and right parties in parliamentary election as an average of all Eu28 countries. 49 As shown in the left panel of the upper row of Figure 8 the shares of extreme left and right parties are growing since the mid-1990s. Whereas in the early 1990s the share was 11 percentage, it has increased to 25 percentage by 2019. As shown in the center and right panels of the upper row of Figure  8 , the polarization has on average tended to take place at the extreme right of the political spectrum. The pattern of political polarization is, however, dependent on the country group. The lower row of Figure  8 shows that the polarization in the southern European countries has mainly gained momentum since the outbreak of the crisis and is tilted towards the left. (Before the crisis buoyant capital inflows allowed for real wage increases and growing government expenditure, causing satisfaction with the ruling parties). This may reflect the hope that more redistribution from the northern European countries will help to stabilize and improve the economic situation. Only more recently also extreme right-wing parties have gained support.
In contrast, the political polarization process in central and eastern Europe is tilted towards the extreme right (second row of Figure 9 ). This may reflect concerns that a redistribution policy in favor of the southern European crisis countries may undermine living standards. Furthermore, because prior to 1990 soft budget constraints and monetary easing have been at the roots of economic decline and political repression in Central and Eastern Europe, the citizens of the former planning economies may be more concerned about the gradual return of the soft budget constraints. In the western and northern European countries including Germany (first row of Figure 9 ) the rise of extreme rightwing parties might reflect concerns of growing parts of the population about the expansionary monetary policy stance and growing mistrust in European institutions. On the one hand, as loose monetary policies can be seen as a corollary of poor economic performance in southern European countries, satisfaction with the conduct of monetary policy is dwindling. On the other hand, as pressure on nominal wages is in the public debate often attributed to globalization, skepticism on free trade and the free movement of labor is growing. 50 Economic and political nationalism becomes a promising strategy to gain votes, as demonstrated by the Brexit or the slogan "France First".
As shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 the political polarization dynamics in Europe seem to be intertwined with monetary policy. The graphs include an indicator for the monetary conditions in the European Monetary Union (which are similar in the United Kingdom). It shows the arithmetic mean of money market interest rates from 1990 to 2012. From 2013 onwards, the money market rates are substituted by a shadow interest rate proxy which converts the extensive bond purchases of the European Central Bank into interest rate cuts. This results in a negative shadow interest rate.
Causality in both directions is conceivable. First, declining support by voters tempts European institutions to spend more to conciliate voters. If tax revenues decline due to depressed growth (as the economic order in Europe is heavily disturbed), political pressures rise to conduct an even looser monetary stance by the ECB to keep government expenditures sustainable. Second, as politicians tend to blame capitalism, globalization or European integration for low growth, interest rates are kept low, and therefore low growth and negative redistribution effects persist. Political polarization continues.
A vicious circle of growing public expenditure, monetary expansion, market interventions, slowing growth and political polarization is endangering the achievements of the European integration process. The resulting divergence processes as heralded by the Brexit, the declared independence of Catalonia, the intended separation of Scotland or the northern league in Italy are becoming more likely. We fear that the Brexit is a forerunner of this upcoming fragmentation process, possibly forerunning because the United Kingdom has a longer tradition of opposing centralization in the European Union (Young 1993).
Outlook
For a long time, Europe's prosperity was based on competition between institutions, which has generated high income levels and generous social security systems. After World War II, the economic orders based on liberal thinking embodied by reforms under Ludwig Erhard and Margret Thatcher laid the economic foundations of the European integration process. Free markets and institutional competition generated the economic basis for real wage increases, the expansion of social security systems and the common European institutions. An institutionally independent monetary authority with a relative tight monetary policy in Germany was the backbone of Germany's rapid growth and thereby the economic foundation of the European integration process.
With the prolonged loose monetary policy stance of the European Central Bank since the turn of the millennium, this economic fundament of the European integration process is in peril. The looming Brexit is likely to shift the political balance in the European Union in favor of the institutional integration and a growth model being-based even more on centralization and central-bank-financial redistribution (Sinn 2016 ) instead of competition and subsidiarity. This will further undermine the competition of orders in Europe, on which Europe's prosperity has been based on. With growth dynamics fading, a divergence process in Europe has set in, which is driven by stagnating wages levels for increasing parts of the population and socially undesired redistribution effects of monetary policy.
The call for solidarity in Europe is coming along with increasing financing needs for the common European institutions. As growth prospects and productivity gains are dim, those policies put political pressure towards a continuation of loose monetary conditions. We fear that increased monetary expansion further paralyzes growth, with social cohesion and redistribution becoming increasingly a zero-sum-game. This constitutes an incentive for northern, central and eastern European countries to leave the European Monetary Union and the European Union. From this perspective, the decision on the Brexit is not a random policy mistake or a negative side effect of labor market integration. Moreover, it may be the first milestone in a painful disintegration process Europe is heading for.
To protect the European Union from major disruptions linked to such a disintegration process -as currently observed in the United Kingdom -a return of institutional competition as stressed by Hume (1742 /1985 ), de Tocqueville (1835 /1945 , and von Hayek (1944) is necessary. A Europe being based on free markets and subsidiarity would -given free factors flows in the common market -increase the welfare of all European citizens, thereby strengthening the European Union. To achieve this goal, the common European institutions have to address and overcome institutional weaknesses. A debate about a general overhaul of the monetary system is necessary to overcome the prolonged phase of low growth. (von Hayek 1944, 231) . See also Vaubel (2008) . 5 "There concurred a happy climate, a soil not unfertile and a most harmonious and comprehensive language so that every circumstance among that people seemed to favour the rise of the arts and sciences. Each city produced its several artists and philosophers who refused to yield the preference to those of the neighbouring republics." Hume (1742 Hume ( /1985 , 121. 6 On 'Exit und Voice' see Hirschmann (1970) . 7 Until then, the common membership of all Western European countries in the Bretton Woods system had kept the exchange rates of Western European currencies to each other largely stable. Adjustments of parities against the dollar (for example, the appreciation of the Deutsche Mark in 1961) were rare. 8 The distinction between functional and institutional integration goes back to Balassa (1961) . A distinctive feature is the varying degree of willingness of countries to renounce the economic sovereignty. Both areas of integration are interconnected because market integration requires common institutions that regulate the integration process. 9 Both the order by Eucken (1952) and the Thatcher reforms were based on von Hayek (1944 Hayek ( , 1945 Hayek ( , and 1968 . 10 The post-war German economic system was rooted in the experiences of the monopolization and cartelization of the late Weimar Republic. The failure of the first German democracy was closely linked to the seizure of control of the great monopolies by the undemocratic forces. This resulted in a command economy, which became transformed into the war economy. 11 The constitutive principles of Eucken (1952) were not implemented in their pure form in Germany either. For example, from the outset large companies have been involved in Germany's economic policy decisions, e.g. in exchange rate policy in the wake of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. 12 In particular, no cartels should be allowed. 13 For instance, contractual freedom in the case of monopolies leads to monopolists overstating prices. Competition without liability can lead to speculation at the expense of the public. 14 The first regulative principle called for a cartel authority to control the market behavior of large companies and to prevent or dissolve monopolies. High inequality, which could possibly result from free market processes, should be corrected by state intervention (regulative principle two). This was achieved via a progressive tax system. The third regulative principle provided for the correction of negative externalities, such as environmental pollution. The state should also intervene in the event of abnormal developments in the labor market, such as long working hours or child labor (regulative principle four). 15 "She reversed what her mentor, Keith Joseph, liked to call "the ratchet effect", whereby the state was rewarded for its failures with yet more power." https://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2013/04/margaret-thatcher.
Notes
